

THE AUXETIC MODE IN ANCIENT RHETORICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

*Εἶωθα μέντοι ἔγωγε τοὺς παλαιοὺς καὶ προτέρους ἡμῶν προτέρους τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγκωμιάζειν ἢ τοὺς νῦν, εὐλαβούμενος μὲν φθόνον τῶν ζώντων, φοβούμενος δὲ μῆνιν τῶν τετελευτηκότων. Plat. *Hip. mai.* 282 a*

If we were to devise a temporal scheme for the three types of ancient rhetorical activity, we would find the idea already clearly formulated in Aristotle (*Rhet.*, II, xviii. 5) who points out that the realm of time covered by the rhetoric of the courthouse is that of the past, while counseling speeches usually refer to the future. It is clear that court rhetoric which concerns itself with what is just—τὸ δίκαιον—has to deal with facts in their accomplished and final form; on the other hand, a consideration of eventual or possible facts is the domain of deliberative rhetoric which deals primarily with what is expedient—τὸ συμφέρον. Positive or negative demonstrability is the desired quality in a survey of things past; adhortative or avertive persuasiveness, the prospect of things to come.

The epideictic speech, however, that aims at the projection of τὸ καλόν, deals with facts as they are generally accepted ², and although amplification lends itself to all three types of speeches ³, since both deliberative and forensic oratory may profit by it, Aristotle believes that it makes the epideictic speech its special domain. Never for a moment does Aristotle forget that an orator addresses an audience. When he considers the effects of amplification in a court speech he adds that the audience does not feel pity in the end but fear (*Rhet.*, I, xiv, 5). Amplification in a deliberative speech too serves the purpose of making the useful things more pronounced and appealing.

Forensic and deliberative oratory, we may summarize, strive towards the

1) Arist. *Rhet.* II. xix, 26: "Ὡστ' ἐπεὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων τὸ προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερόν ἐστι δι' ἐκείνων ληπτέον τὰς ἀυξήσεις πᾶσιν.

2) Arist. *Rhet.* I. ix, 40: "Ὅλων δὲ τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν ἅπανσι τοῖς λόγοις ἢ μὲν αὐξήσις ἐπιτηδαιοτάτη τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς τὰς πράξεις ὁμολογουμένως λαμβάνουσιν, ὥστε λοιπὸν μέγεθος περιθεῖναι καὶ κάλλος.

3) Arist. *Rhet.* II. xviii, 5: "Ἔστι δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ μὲν αὐξῆσιν οἰκειότατον τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ὡσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς τοῖς δικανικοῖς—περὶ τούτων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις—, τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐσόμενον τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς.

establishing of a fact or the engendering of an opinion. Both, that is, aim at objects lying outside them. Unlike the two previous types, epideictic oratory could be termed as the least utilitarian, or the most «artistic» in the modern sense of the word. The epideictic was rightly expected by ancient audiences to be the least demanding, the most pleasurable, the least tiresome, the most festive of speeches. In fact, were it not for some presentational differences—the single performer, the absence of dance and music—those audiences must have found such speeches not unlike prose hymns.

As we move from the forensic to the epideictic speech, (as from cult hymn to rhapsodic hymn), we notice that the materials to be integrated by these forms are not those imposed by the necessities of «reality» on the writers, but rather those bequeathed by tradition. In the absence of circumstantial content—elements, amplification is used not so much for the sake of creating an attitude in the listeners' minds as for the sake of projecting or suppressing the various materials within the work, for the sake, that is, of controlling coherence and organization.

The extent to which amplification was viewed by the ancient rhetoricians as a means par excellence of influencing listeners can be realized by an examination of those passages that contain instances of theory on amplification. The majority of these statements are concerned with the effects of amplification on the minds of potential judges :

The wildest crime will appear more so, and the premeditated one even worse. And the worst is that which the audience fears rather than pities. And here are the rhetorical means to achieve this : the many just things against which he has offended or transgressed, such as oaths, solemn pledges, matrimony, will be like the heaping of countless crimes ⁴.

Cicero says that amplification can be used once a thing has been proved or refuted ⁵, and he has the court in mind when he speaks of the relationship between *amplificatio* and *indignatio* ⁶. Quintilian, is thinking of the court when he speaks of the shoals that endanger a boat even though his metaphor is half naval, half theatrical : it is only after the shoals are left behind that the boat

4) Arist. *Rhet.* I xiv, 5 : Καὶ τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἀδίκημα μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ οἱ ἀκούοντες φοβεῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ρητορικά ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι πολλὰ ἀνήρηκε δίκαια ἢ ὑπερβέβηκεν, οἷον ὄρκους, δεξιάς πιστεῖς ἐπιγαμίας· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων ὑπεροχή.

5) Cicero, *Part. orat.* 52 sqq. : Augendi autem et hic est locus proprius in perorando, et in curso ipso orationis declinationes ad amplificandum dantur, confirmata re aliqua aut reprehensa. Est igitur amplificatio gravior quaedam adfirmatio, quae motu animorum conciliet in dicendo fidem.

6. Cicero, *De inv.* I, 53 : Indignatio est oratio per quam conficitur ut in aliquem hominem magnus odium aut in rem gravis offensio concitetur. . . . Nam ex eis rebus quae personis aut quae negotiis sunt attributae quaevis amplificationes et indignationes nasci possunt. . . .

can unfurl its sail ; only then, after the main body of the argument has been set forth, may the orator open the taps of his eloquence. This is where, Quintilian says, in effect, amplification belongs ⁷.

Cicero too ⁸ like Quintilian and like Aristotle ⁹ believes that amplification is particularly effective in the peroration. After examining all the *loci* that are susceptible of amplification, our rhetoricians seem to agree that the epilogue is *the locus* for amplification.

We must observe, however, that the *actual* speeches of many practitioners present a peculiar crisis concerning amplification and its aims. So much so, we might add, that the beginnings of their speeches do not know their ends.

Longinus seems to have been the first to detect, or imagine, a similar crisis in Isocrates ¹⁰. Longinus attributes puerility to Isocrates who undermines the very foundation of his speech by reminding his listeners of the power of rhetoric that can make great things seem small, and small ones seem great. To Longinus' mind a statement like Isocrates' could not possibly enhance sublimity, a subject with which Longinus is so obsessed that he cannot allow the possibility for Isocrates to be trailing a red herring across the path of his listeners' credulity. Longinus, simply, cannot see in Isocrates' seeming self-conscious acknowledgment of the sins of the art a device that will enable the orator to perpetrate even more sins of meddling with reality.

Most important : Longinus cannot see in an orator's initial confession of

7) Quintil. *Inst. or.* VI, 51 : At hic [the epilogue] si usquam, totos eloquentiae possidebimus iam iudicum animos, et e confragosis atque asperis evecti tota pendere possumus vela, cum sit maxima pars epilogi amplificatio, verbis atque sententiis ut licet magnificis et ornatis. Tunc est commovendum theatrum, cum ventum est ad ipsum illud, quo veteres tragædiæ comediaræque cluduntur, «Plodite».

8) See note 5, above.

9) Arist. *Rhet.* III. xii. 4. : Καὶ τὰ ἀσύνδετα ὡσαύτως· «ἤλθον, ἀπήντησα, ἐδεόμην»· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑποκρίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐν λέγοντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἕθει καὶ τόνῳ εἰπεῖν. ἔτι ἔχει ἰδίον τι τὰ ἀσύνδετα· ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ χρόνῳ πολλὰ δοκεῖ εἰρῆσθαι· ὁ γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλὰ, ὡστ' ἐὰν ἐξαίρεθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι τὸναντίον ἔσται τὸ ἐν πολλὰ. ἔχει οὖν αὐξήσιν· «ἤλθον, διελέχθην, ἰκέτευσα»· πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἶπεν. Cf. III. xix, 6 : Τελευτῆ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἀρμόττει ἢ ἀσύνδετος, ὅπως ἐπιλογος ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος ἢ· «εἶρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε.»

10) Long. *De subl.* XXXVI, 1, 2-3 : 'Ο γοῦν Ἰσοκράτης οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως παιδὸς πρᾶγμα ἔπαθεν διὰ τὴν τοῦ πάντα αὐξητικῶς ἐθέλειν λέγειν φιλοτιμίαν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὑπόθεσις αὐτῷ τοῦ Πανηγυρικοῦ λόγου, ὡς ἡ Ἀθηναίων πόλις ταῖς εἰς τοὺς Ἑλληνας εὐεργεσίαις ὑπερβάλλει τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὁ δ' εὐθὺς ἐν τῇ εἰσβολῇ ταῦτα τίθησιν : «ἐπειθ' οἱ λόγοι τοσαύτην ἔχουσι δύναμιν, ὡστ' οἶον τ' εἶναι καὶ τὰ μεγάλα ταπεινά ποιεῖσαι καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς περιθεῖναι μέγεθος, καὶ τὰ παλαιὰ καινῶς εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν νεωστὶ γεγεννημένων ἀρχαίως διελθεῖν». οὐκοῦν, φησὶ τις, Ἰσόκρατες, οὕτως μέλλει καὶ τὰ περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἐναλλάττειν ; σχεδὸν γὰρ τὸ τῶν λόγων ἐγκώμιον ἀπιστίας τῆς καθ' αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἀκούουσι παράγγελμα καὶ προοίμιον ἐξέθηκε.

customary misrepresentation a live convention. Isocrates does nothing but echo Plato's words about orators ; he even includes Plato's views on the way orators deal with the past and present ¹¹.

The parallel contrast between small and great things, in a slightly different context, reappears in one of the introductory paragraphs of the *Panathenaios*. Isocrates says that he is fully aware of the fact, and, moreover, has often said it before, that it is easy, through amplification, to magnify unimportant things ; the difficulties arise when words or praise must come up to deeds that are excellent in themselves ¹². In his *Bousiris* ¹³, Isocrates states that those who are about to praise someone come up with more good attributes than can actually be found in him, while those who are about to disparage someone come up with fewer. Julian the Emperor says that through «the art», one can deal with small matters in the grand manner, just as one can, at will, detract from great matters ¹⁴.

Pericles, just before his praise of the first dead in the Peloponnesian war, says that of his listeners those who are well informed and well disposed towards the dead will think that the speech falls short of things as they know them and as they would like to hear them spoken of. Those, however, who have no experience of such things will think that the speech contains exaggerations, and this specific attitude, in case there is something in the speech that is beyond the listeners' capabilities, may be the result of envy. Praises, indeed, are tolerable in so far as each of the listeners thinks himself capable of performing something of the things reported ; to all exaggerations, however, listeners respond through envy and doubt ¹⁵. This paragraph, we remember, is the central point of an introductory argument that discusses the convention of funerary speechmaking : this convention, Pericles says, may be wrong because of the indeterminacy of the effects of such speeches on the minds of the listeners, since small things

11) Plat. *Phaedr.* 267 A : . . . τά τε αὖ μικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα μικρὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσιν διὰ βρόμην λόγου, καινὰ τε ἀρχαίως τὰ τ' ἐναντία καινῶς. . . .

12) Isocr. *Panath.* 36 : ἀλλ' ἀκριβῶς εἰδῶς, καὶ πολλάκις εἰρηκῶς ἴδρι τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ῥάδιον τοῖς λόγοις ἀυξῆσαι, τοῖς δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ κάλλει χαλεπὸν ἐξισῶσαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους.

13) Isocr. *Bus.* 4 : Ἀπάντων γὰρ εἰδῶτων ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μὲν εὐλογεῖν τινὰς βουλομένους πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀγαθῶν προσόντ' ἀποφάνειν, τοὺς δὲ κατηγοροῦντας τὴν κεντρία τούτων ποιεῖν. . . .

14) Jul. Imp. *Enc. ad Const.* 2 : Οἱ δὲ τῆς τέχνης ἀπολαῦσαι φασιν ἐν τῷ δύνασθα, περὶ τῶν μικρῶν μειζῶνως διελθεῖν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἀφελεῖν τῶν ἔργων τῷ λόγῳ. . . .

15) Thuc. *Hist.* II. xxxv, 2 : Ὅ τε ξυνειδῶς καὶ εὖνους ἀκρατῆς τάχ' ἂν τι ἐνδεεστέρως πρὸς ἂ βούλεται τε καὶ ἐπίσταται νομίσειε δηλοῦσθαι, ὃ τε ἀπειρος ἔστιν ἂ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον, εἰ τι ὑπὲρ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀκούσι. μέχρι γὰρ τοῦδε ἀνεκτοὶ οἱ ἐπαινοὶ εἰσι περὶ ἐτέρων λεγόμενοι, ἐς ὅσον ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος οἴηται ἱκανὸς εἶναι δρᾶσαι τι ὧν ἤκουσεν· τῷ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτῶν φθονοῦντες ἤδη καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν.

may appear smaller, while large things may appear larger. Pericles then proposes to speak first of the cause the dead had fought and died for.

He begins with the ancestors whom «it is just and proper to mention on such an occasion»—δικαίον καὶ πρέπον. Next come the ancestors who «through their valour»—δι' ἀρετῆν—founded a free land. Then come the «fathers» who are «worthy of praise and much more» —ἄξιοι ἐπικίνου καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον and, finally, the speaker's contemporaries. At this point, Pericles lays out the plan for the remaining part of his speech. It will present mainly the ways and means through which the land became great. Only then will he speak about the dead. His survey begins with the laws of the land, its agonistic and religious institutions, and ends with the attitude of the Athenians towards war, education, art, and philosophy. Then by way of concluding the preceding considerations and, also, in order to introduce the praise that follows, Pericles produces a section on Athens itself that is, literally, teeming with auxeses ¹⁶. «This is not the bragging» he says «usually found in speeches ; it is the truth of the matter that Athens alone—μόνη—when seen proves superior even to her fame». (And μόνη occurs once more before the next sentence). «We do not need Homer to extoll us . . . » «Through our courage we made both sea and land yield . . . » We should also note some instances of covert auxesis : «Athens as a whole is Hellas' education». Here we might expect the adjective πᾶσα to occur before Hellas. But this is hardly necessary : the reading of Thucydides' first chapters, where he gives us the history of the communal feeling that went into the making of the collective term Hellenism or Hellas, convinces that to say Hellas was to say a lot.

When Pericles comes to the dead before him, he gives them just one paragraph. And that is expressed in antithetical pairs that tend to balance one another : «they benefitted the common cause ; they did not harm by minding their privacy» ¹⁷. After the multiple, dazzling, introduction that precedes the epitaph properly speaking, we scarcely need any auxesis.

Isocrates, too, in his encomium of Helen ¹⁸ begins with a mention of his subject's origins. His very first sentence contains amplification. But this doesn't last, for, in what seems like a digression, Isocrates undertakes an encomium of

16) Thuc. *Hist.* II. xli, 2 and 4 : Καὶ ὡς οὐ λόγων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κόμπος τάδε μᾶλλον ἢ ἔργων ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια, αὕτη ἢ δύναμις τῆς πόλεως σημαίνει. μόνη γὰρ τῶν νῦν ἀκοῆς κρείστων ἐς πείραν ἔρχεται, καὶ μόνη . . . etc.; my italics.

. . . οὐδὲν προσδεόμενοι οὔτε Ὀμήρου ἐπαινέτου οὔτε ὅστις ἔπεισι μὲν τὸ αὐτίκα τέρπει, τῶν δ' ἔργων τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἢ ἀλήθεια βλάψει, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν ἐσβατὸν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ τόλμῃ καταναγκάσαντες γενέσθαι, πανταχοῦ δὲ μνημεῖα κακῶν τε κάγαθῶν ἀΐδια ξυγκατοικίσαντες.

17) Κοινῶς μᾶλλον ὠφέλησαν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἐβλαψαν.

18) Isocr. *Hel.* 16 : τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου ποιήσομαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ γένους αὐτῆς. πλείστων γὰρ ἡμιθέων ὑπὸ Διὸς γεννηθέντων μόνης τσούτης γυναικὸς πατὴρ ἠξίωσε κληθῆναι.

Herakles and Theseus who «alone became champions of man's life»¹⁹. The hero «alone» kills the bull that pesters the countryside. The hero kills the Minotaur and thus frees the land of a duty that was hard to shake off²⁰. In short, there is more on Theseus than on Helen. And, in a manner more explicit than Pericles' expansiveness, Isocrates says that the very fact of Theseus' love for Helen constitutes the crowning argument for her outstanding virtue and intelligence²¹. Unlike the dead soldiers in Thucydides, Helen is the immediate subject of a great deal of amplification. Yet, Isocrates has made an important, if not the most important part of her praise rest outside her, on the amplification, namely, bestowed upon the exemplary figures of Zeus, Herakles, and Theseus. In a similarly contrapuntal way, the dead and their deeds in the Peloponnesian war, the *raison d'être* itself of the epitaphios, in Thucydides, are being amplified throughout Pericles' predominantly allusive speech. And as he moves from ancestors to contemporaries, and from the laws (traditionally God-given) to philosophy in Athens, he has been, all the time, really, talking about the dead soldiers.

We might, therefore, admit of a macrostructural, as it were, as well as of a microstructural auxesis. The latter manifests itself in the immediate verbal and syntactical constructions around a given subject. The former springs from the larger, and broader contextual oppositions of the units of the work, themselves constituted of a series of microstructural amplifications.

Amplification can be the result of stress, or even the change of stress on any part of speech. It can result from the creation or obliteration of a relationship. It may be achieved through repetition. It can show aggrandizement through time—*πρῶτον*—space—*παντῆ*—manner—*δι' ἀρετῆν*—and, finally, through inserts referring to the author's own art.

The epideictic speech, just like the rhapsodic hymn, had to come a long way before developing into the self-contained, and self-sufficient artifact that we now know. The distance between Chryses' prayer to Apollo and a hymn by Callimachus must be the same as that between the speeches of the orators on the shield of Achilles (*Il.*, 18. 495–508) to Isocrates' *Helen*. The forensic speech is hyperbolic by necessity; the cult hymn is hyperbolic by the ruling of ritual. Yet, the authors of epideictic speeches, as well as those of rhapsodic hymns, still continue to make use of hyperbole, only, we might add, with some feelings of insecurity. The really massive instrument of amplification may disturb the

19) Isocr. *Hel.* 23 : Μόνοι γάρ οὔτοι τῶν προγεγενημένων ὑπὲρ τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίου ἀθληταὶ κατέστησαν.

20) Isocr. *Hel.* 28 : Τοὺς μὲν παῖδας διασώσας τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἀπέδωκε, τὴν δὲ πόλιν, οὕτως ἀνόμου καὶ δεινοῦ καὶ δυσπαλλάκτου προστάγματος ἠλευθέρωσε.

21) Isocr. *Hel.* 38 : Τὴν δὴ γεννηθεῖσαν μὲν ὑπὸ Διός, κρατήσασαν δὲ τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς καὶ σωφροσύνης πῶς πῶς οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν χρὴ καὶ τιμᾶν καὶ νομίζειν πολὺ τῶν πρόποτε γενομένων διενεγκεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ μάρτυρα γε πιστότερον οὐδὲ κριτὴν ἰκανώτερον ἔξομεν ἐπαγαγέσθαι περὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνι προσόντων ἀγαθῶν τῆς Θησεῶς διανοίας.

degree of assimilation of the materials within the framework of their creation. Misplaced or mishandled amplification, especially in works of a type traditionally loaded with it, might easily lead to unfair, unwarranted, and badly integrated comparisons; it might lead, as some unitarian, neo-classicist critics would say, to unresolved aesthetic experiences. Amplification, in the words of Plato, may well result in a more powerful speech—«διὰ ῥώμην λόγου»—but it does not make the logographers and the hymnographers the less insecure: the beauty and robustness of a work of art is not immune to malign influences. The modesty of authors may make them see austere critics in every member of their audiences. The consciousness of achievement which is inherent in every artist must be basically responsible for the attitude that represents works of art as susceptible to the «evil eye» especially when these works are believed to be beautiful²².

A strange case of «invidia» appears in Quintilian²³ as a result of the excitation of an audience by the orator's amplification of atrocities. An uninformed listener in the *epitaphios* of Pericles feels envious if he hears of an exploit that exceeds his capabilities. And, again, there is a note that exaggeration makes the audience be one of φθονοῦντες (Thucyd. II, xxiv, 6). The verb that follows φθονοῦντες is ἀπιστοῦσιν. Φθονοῦντες cannot mean «envious» and at the same time be joined to ἀπιστοῦσιν by «καί»; an action described as «envied» cannot at the same time be denied existence. We might experiment with the semantic possibilities of φθόνος in two other directions. On one hand, it could mean not envy of the actions, in which case Pericles' previous line on impossible comparisons would be out of place, but envy of the high praise in honour of the actions which, in turn, are discredited as blown up. Yet, φθόνος could be taken not as «envy», but as resentment directed against the speaker for unduly magnifying the dead and, somehow, through such an activity demeaning the living.

We may now see φθόνος as the necessary antithetical complement to the statements concerning amplification. In an aporetic passage in Helen²⁴, Isocrates decides, in consideration of those who cannot take too much, to leave a great

22) See note 11 above. On the *mal'occhio* as a form of envy see S. Eitrem, «The Pindaric Phthonos» in *Studies presented to David More Robinson*, George Mylonas ed., Washington University, Saint Louis, Missouri, 1953, II, pp. 532 and 534, notes 7 and 9. Professor Eitrem's admirable thesis presents phthonos as a divine, popular, and critical reaction to the athletic achievement and the poem commemorating it. In this paper I have concerned myself with phthonos as an expression of auctorial self-awareness.

23) Quint. *Inst. or.* VIII. iv, 19: Cum res atrocissimas quasque in summam ipsi extulimus invidiam elevamus consulto, quo graviora videantur quae secutura sunt, ut a Cicerone factum est, cum illa diceret, *levia sunt haec in hoc reo* etc.

24) Isocr. *Hel.* 29: Ἀπορῶ δ' ὅτι χρήσομαι τοῖς ἐπιλοίοις. . . αἰροῦμαι τὰ μὲν πλείστα παραλιπεῖν διὰ τοὺς δυσκόλως ἀκρωμένους, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι συντομώτατα διελθεῖν, ἵνα τὰ μὲν ἐκείνοις, τὰ δ' ἑμαυτῷ χαρίσωμαι, καὶ μὴ παντάπασιν ἠτηθῶ τῶν εἰθισμένων φθонеῖν καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἅπασιν ἐπιτιμᾶν.

deaf unsaid : he proposes to cover the remaining of his material as swiftly as he can, both for his own sake and for the sake of his grumbling listeners. He will do that, he says, for one more reason : to avoid being defeated by those customarily envious and censorious of everything that is being said.

The semantics of φθόνος following a *recusatio* make the point clear : The author will write less to give adverse criticism less food. Who knows, he might even be called as unrestrained and voluminous as the Assyrian river ²⁵. The world is simply full of professional detractors.

But perhaps we should conclude that they are detractors of the mind. For, after the twenty-ninth paragraph where this statement occurs, our author goes on and writes twenty-nine more.

Π Ε Ρ Ι Λ Η Ψ Ι Σ

Ἡ μελέτη αὕτη ἐξετάζει μίαν γνωστὴν μορφήν τῆς ἐπιτεταμένης ἐκφράσεως ὅταν ὁ ποιητὴς (ἢ τὸ φερέφωνόν του εἰς τὸ ποίημα, τὸ μυθιστόρημα ἢ καὶ τὸ δράμα) λέγει τί δὲν θὰ εἴπη, χειρίζεται μίαν δομήν, παρομοίαν τῆς ὁποίας συναντῶμεν εἰς τὰ ὑπερβολικὰ κατηγορήματα, εἰς τὸ ἔμμεσον τῆς παρουσιάσεως τοῦ ἔργου καὶ συχνάκις εἰς τὰς ἀναφορὰς περὶ τῆς πιθανῆς εὐμενοῦς ἢ δυσμενοῦς ὑποδοχῆς τοῦ ἔργου.

Μὲ τὴν ἐξέτασιν πρῶτον τοῦ λεκτικοῦ καὶ ἐν συνεχείᾳ μέχρι τοῦ σχηματολογικοῦ τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ μὲ παραδείγματα ληφθέντα παρὰ συγγραφέων παρουσιαζόντων μεγάλας διαφορὰς ἢ μελέτη ἀπέβλεψε νὰ ῥίψη φῶς ὅχι εἰς τὰ περιβάλλοντα τὸ κάθε κείμενον ἱστορικὰ ἀνέκδοτα («εἶναι ὄντως ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Ρόδιος ὁ Ἀσσύριος ποταμὸς τοῦ Καλλιμάχου ;») οὔτε εἰς τὴν τύχην τοῦ θέματος εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἢ τὰ χεῖλη τοῦ λογοτέχνου, ἀλλὰ εἰς τὴν ἔνσωματωμένην «ποιητικὴν» του, εἰς τὴν δημιουργικὴν αὐτοσυνειδησίαν του, τὴν δεχομένην μὲν ἐπηρασμοὺς ἐκ μέρους ἀκροατηρίων καὶ κριτικῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰφνιδιάζουσιν διὰ τῆς ἐπιμόνου ταλαντεύσεως μεταξὺ ἀφελείας καὶ εἰρωνείας, γέλωτος καὶ ἐργασίας, προσδοκίας καὶ ἀναδρομῆς.

25) Callim. *Hy. ad. Apol.*, v. 108.